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Assistant Director for Operations

18 March 1947

Chief, ICAPS

Exploitation of Enemy Document Repositories

1. Attached papers are returned with recommendation that the project be presented to the Projects Review Committee after withdrawing Tab "B" which investigation has found to be inaccurate.

2. The reasons why Tab "B" is considered inaccurate follow:

a. The statements made in the Committee report on the Washington Document Center are correct. The 35% of documents dealing with economic subjects were included because it was considered that they had at least an indirect bearing on the psychological aspect of the problem. Only 1 Japanese translator was provided for because it was understood the Document Branch would, in its abstracting and cataloguing, cover a large portion of the material. Mr. Bagnall has confirmed this understanding.

The original ONI paper requesting this study gave as its primary interest material related to the USSR, but desired coverage on the entire world. There is no necessity for clarification in the Committee report which gave the results of its study on the ONI request.

b. The statement that the GMDs material has been reduced from seven to four tons is refuted by the Intelligence Division, WDGS, after consultation with Major Seeley, the officer in charge of this section. It was stated that there are still about seven tons of material at this Center.

c. Whereas there may be some dispute with respect to the Kulturabteilung files at Tempelhof, there remains at this Center a tremendous volume of material which requires processing, and remains available to exploitation.

d. Captured materials in the U.K. which are within the control of the Air Ministry contain both technical and non-technical documents. The non-technical material is available in considerable volume for exploitation.

3. The Committee report has been found to be basically correct, and represents as complete a survey as can be made in this country based on available information. Information on Centers in U.K. and Germany is admittedly scant, but with conditions continually changing a more complete

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survey is impracticable. There definitely appears to be sufficient material in those areas to warrant the employment of a three translator team under present conditions.

4. It is not recommended that this project be extended to include all types of intelligence. The recommendations contained in the Committee report were framed specifically to accomplish the project requested by the Chief of Naval Intelligence. Normal processing procedures of the several Centers should ultimately provide for all types of intelligence without the expenditure of funds by CIG for this purpose.

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